In Barrington v. Barrington, a mother was not satisfied with sharing joint custody of her children.   Instead, as the court found at trial:

 the mother persistently engaged in a course of conduct calculated to frustrate the father's efforts to have a meaningful relationship with the son. In particular, she repeatedly refused to allow the father mid-week visitation with the son and, on one occasion, unnecessarily involved the police in an argument that she had with the father when he was returning the son to her after a visit. She also sought to align the son with her in her dispute with the father, even though she was well aware that such conduct was clearly not in the child's best interests

Given the mother’s conduct, the Court granted the father custody of the son.  

The Office of Court Administration just issued a set of  Guidelines for Family Court judges to ensure open access to the courts by the public and the press. The guidelines provide that:

• In a respectful manner, court staff may ask each person who seeks entrance to a courtroom if he or she is a party, witness or otherwise associated with a specific calendared case.

• A person who wishes to observe the proceedings will be permitted to sit in the courtroom subject to the limitations of courtroom capacity.

• Courtroom staff will inform the judge if there is a member of the press or an observer in the courtroom and whether or not he or she has any role in the case.

• When a case is called, the judge may advise the parties that there is an observer in the courtroom and ask if anyone has an objection.

• On a case-by-case basis, prior to ordering exclusion, the judge must make findings, based on supporting evidence, that the exclusion is warranted.

According to the New York Journal, “Judges are supposed to exclude the public only if the person is likely to cause a disruption, one of the parties objects for a compelling reason or when the protection of children requires that some or all observers be excluded from the courtroom."

The Florida Divorce Blog commenting on the Time’s article, enumerated some of the ways in which access to the courtroom is limited:

•  Courtroom doors are locked;
•  Do Not Enter and Stop signs are posted on courtroom doors;
•  Signs are posted proclaiming that only people on official business may enter; and
•   Guards challenging those seeking entrance to courtrooms.

My experience in Family Court is that until a case is called, the litigants must wait outside the courtroom in a waiting area.  Only the parties and their attorneys are allowed in the courtroom. 

That the Court violates its own rules is indefensible. A judicial tribunal should not be allowed to arbitrarily select which rules are to be enforced and which may be ignored.  What kind of example does that set for the litigants whose cases the courts are adjudicating?  Can some laws simply be disregarded without consequence? 

On the other hand, is the denial of access to family court proceedings really a bad thing?  The often gut wrenching issues in Family Court involve intimidate details of families in distress; the Family Court hears cases involve domestic violence, child abuse and child custody.  The litigants should have the right to some privacy and not to be compelled to air their dirty laundry to anyone who is simply curious to listen. 

Absolute rules – requiring, on one hand, completely open the courtrooms and, on the other hand, justifying justice shrouded in secrecy –don’t work.  Clearly, there has to be some transparency to the system.  While there are rules of procedures in place, there has to be transparency to ensure that the rules are followed to prevent the “system” from running roughshod over the rights of litigants. Nevertheless, the need for the system’s transparency has to be measured against the families’ need for privacy.   

As long as there is a rule requiring that the courtrooms must be open and accessible to the public, the rule should be enforced.   A judge, however, should have the discretion upon a litigant’s request or when taking testimony of a sensitive nature to close the courtroom.

The college application process can be an extremely stressful experience in a young person's life; adding to the child’s stress about deciding where to apply and which school to attend is the child's awareness that his or her choice of a college will provide yet another opportunity for parental conflict over who is going to pay for college.  In New York, divorced parents oft seek to apply the "SUNY cap."

 The SUNY cap is one of the devises employed by New York divorce attorneys to address the issue how to pay for children’s college education.      

 It is common in New York for divorcing parents to agree in their settlement agreements how college expenses will be paid.  Sometimes the parties agree to split the actual costs of pursuing a higher education; other times one parent solely agrees to bear the burden.   More often, the parties agree to limit their obligation to pay for their children’s college education to a percentage of the cost of a State University of New York (SUNY) school.   This limitation is referred to as a “SUNY Cap.”   

 An agreement to apply the SUNY cap and to limit a parent’s contribution to a child’s college education will be enforced regardless of whether the child attends a public or private educational institution. 

In the absence of an agreement, the Domestic Relations Law empowers a court to order a parent to pay for college.  Among the factors that Courts  consider in determining whether to award college expenses are the educational background of the parents, their financial ability to provide the necessary funds, the child's academic ability and endeavors, and the type of college that would be most suitable for the child.

More problematic is when, in the absence of an agreement, college expenses will be paid.   In the recent case, Pamela T. v Marc B., the parties did not have an agreement as to how they would pay for the children’s college education, the court refused to apply a SUNY cap. 

In Pamela T.  v. Marc B., the Court announced that:

There is no basis to impose the SUNY cap, to the extent that it should be imposed at all, where the party seeking to invoke the cap has the financial ability to contribute towards the actual amount of his or her child's college expenses.

The Court noted that even if a SUNY were to be imposed, it would not be determinative as to what school the child would attend.    As the Court noted:

Contrary to what proponents of a wide and liberal application of the SUNY cap might urge, the SUNY system should not be the assumed destination of the children of divorce.

In selecting the college, a litany of factors should be considered, including the educational curriculum, the make-up of the student body, and active alumni networks. “Other considerations might include such things as the size of the school, the type of campus, the architectural distinction of the buildings, the nature of its athletic programs, the services provided to students with either physical or learning disabilities, and the type of city or town in which the school is located. “

In short, the failure to address the how the costs of college will be handled in a settlement agreement only leaves the door open to litigation when the children are college bound.   

As detailed in the Rochester Family Lawyer Blog, the mother in Keefe v. Adams interfered with father’s visitation by:

• Relocating 42 miles away from father, without informing him; (The relocation required the child to change schools.)
• Consistently arriving up to two hours late for drop off and pick ups;
• Promoting her boyfriend as substitute for child’s father; and
• Using the drop off and pick ups of the child as an opportunity to berate the father in front of the child.

The Court rightfully concluded that the mother’s conduct was detrimental to the child and indicative of her unwillingness to foster a strong relationship between the child and the father.   On the other hand, because the father “manifests a markedly greater ability to control his behavior in front of the child, as well as a willingness to foster the relationship between the mother and child,” the Court granted the father physical custody of the parties’ child.  

What happens, when after trial, the court finds that both parents are so flawed and lacking in parenting skills that neither should have sole custody of the child?

In M.R v. A.D., a Manhattan judge, after splitting physical custody of a child, opined that “neither of these parents has the skills or qualities to be [the child’s] sole custodian.   Instead, the court identified each parent’s parenting strengths to define particular “spheres in which each party with be the final decision maker.”    

The mother, characterized as warm and loving, but chaotic, unpredictable and unable to establish firm or consistent boundaries was granted decision making over summer camp, extracurricular activities, and religion. The father, described as gruff, not particularly warm or affectionate, but capable of setting firm standards for the child’s behavior, was granted decision-making over issues relating to the child’s education and health.

In reaching this Solomon-like decision, the court recognized that because of the acrimony between the parties, joint custody was not an option; the parties could not communicate effectively with each other to make joint decisions.  After assessing the parties’ individual parenting strengths and weaknesses, the court fashioned a custodial arrangement that allows each parent to make decisions on different aspects of the child’s life. 

The decision, which gives each parent parallel custody, is a novel method of resolving a custody dispute.   Rather than “winner-take-all,” this win-win approach assures each parent’s continued involvement in the child’s life, with decisions being made by the parent best suited for doing so.  

The relocation pits one parent’s desire to move for familial, economic, romantic or employment reasons against the other parent’s desire to have an unimpeded relationship with the parties’ children.  

Recently, the Appellate Division, in Matter of Alaire K. G. v Anthony P. G., was forced to weigh a mother’s desire to move to California to be with her new husband against the father’s desire to have regular and frequent access time with the parties’ son in New York. 

As enunciated in leading case  Matter of Tropea v Tropea, the ultimate question is "what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child." 

Among the factors the court must consider are: (1) "each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move," (2) the quality of the child's relationship with each parent, (3) the impact of the move on the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent, (4) the degree to which the move may enhance the custodial parent's and child's life economically, emotionally and educationally, and (5) "the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements.”

In Alaire, the parties were divorced in 2006.   The mother was granted custody of the parties’ son, then 2 years old.    In 2008, she met her new husband, who accepted a job in San Diego.   The mother attempted to mediate the terms of the relocation, but the father refused to sign the agreement.   According to the opinion, the mother’s plan to move became “irreversible” so she left for California without her son.   The son lived with the father, in New York, until 2010, when the Family Court approved the mother’s application to relocate with the son.

 Though the dissenting judges were persuaded that mother put her desire for a romantic partner ahead of her son’s welfare by seeking to move the child 3,000 miles away from his father, the majority concluded the move was in the child’s best interests. 

 Among the factors relevant to the majority were:

1. The child would be raised with his half-brother, born in 2009, to the mother and her new husband.
2. The mother’s new husband was employed and had health insurance; the father apparently had been injured and was unemployed.
3. The mother was required to pay for air travel for the child to be with the father for extended weekends and holidays. 
4.  The Court concluded that the schools in California were as good, if not better, than those in New York and, because the wife’s new husband was a veteran, the child would be entitled to attend a California state university free of charge. 

This unfortunate case highlights the complexity of a relocation case.   Each relocation case must be considered on the merits of the relevant facts, with the predominant emphasis being placed on the outcome that is most likely to serve the best interests of the child.  

The guardian is an attorney who is appointed to represent the children.   If there are multiple children, it is possible there can be more than one guardian.

The role of the guardian is to articulate the children’s interests, which are gleaned from conversations with the children, the parents, the children’s teachers, doctors and any other person’s deemed appropriate.  In doing so, the Court, through the guardian’s advocacy, can determine issues related to custody, visitation or access time, as well as other issues involving the children’s health, education and welfare independent of the children’s parents positions.   

The guardian is not a neutral party. He/she is representing the children.  Sometimes, the children’s position will align with one of the parents; other times the guardian will advance a position that is a combination of both parents’ theories of the case. 

Unlike communications with your attorney, your statements, writings and emails to the guardian are not privileged.    They can and will be used against you.   Therefore, it is important to be circumspect and thoughtful when communicating to the guardian.

Custody cases are decided on the basis of what is in the children’s best interests.  A thoughtful discussion about why your position is in the children’s best interests does not require a denigration of your spouse. 

For instance, an important factor in custody disputes is recognizing which parent will most likely foster the children’s relationship with the other parent.     Constant criticism of your spouse or demonstration of any alienating behaviors could turn a potential ally into an adversary.  

Custody can easily be broken into two components:  physical custody, and decision making.   Physical custody refers to where and when the children will be with a parent. Decision marking generally refers to who is going to make the major decisions regarding the health, education and welfare of the children. 

 As Eory points out, indeterminate language in a custody agreement, like the commonly used  phrase “liberal and reasonable parenting time”, are a recipe for trouble since the absence of detail will lead to misunderstandings, disagreements, disappointments and in some cases, a litigation to establish that which should have been fashioned in the first place.”

While joint decision making generally refers to the major decisions regarding the children’s health, education and welfare, issue arise as to the distinctions between what is major decision as opposed to one that is routine. 

 Standing alone, “joint custody” does nothing to resolve such issues, much less create a mechanism for resolution if a dispute arises.

If decision making is shared, do the parents have to merely consult with each other or actually agree?  What happens if there is no agreement?  How are disagreements resolved?

While joint custody arrangements are desirable to maintain joint parental involvement in the rearing of children, it does not mean that details of the custodial arrangement should be deferred from the time to divorce to some future date when disputes arise.  A successful joint custody arrangement forces the parents to thoughtfully work out an access schedule and a method of decision making long before disputes arise, so as to avoid future issues.  

The reasons for the move, which are generally described as benefiting the custodial parent and the children, must be carefully weighed against the negative effect the move will have on the non-custodial parent’s relationship with the children. 

One judge came up with a clever solution- video or tele-conference visitation. 

In Baker v. Baker, the Judge permitted a mother, who was about to lose her home to foreclosure to relocate to Florida, where she could live with her parents, provided that father could video chat with the children, via skype, several times a week.;

In considering the relocation, the Court cited the standard announced in the Court of Appeals in the Tropea v. Tropea:

 . . . we hold that, in all cases, the courts should be free to consider and give appropriate weight to all of the factors that may be relevant to the determination. These factors include, but are certainly not limited to each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial parent's and child's life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements. In the end, it is for the court to determine, based on all of the proof, whether it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence that a proposed relocation would serve the child's best interests

While scheduled video conference is not a substitute for sharing a meal, tossing a ball, or enjoining a hug with a child, it does provide a way of maintaining regular and meaningful communication.  

Visitation via video conference may not be the solution in all cases, but it offered a fair resolution in this case where the mother and children had to move because their home was in foreclosure. 

In Lauren R. v Ted R. Justice Robert Ross ordered to the mother to report to jail for repeatedly violating the terms of the court orders regarding the father’s parenting time. The mother’s imprisonment coincides with the father’s scheduled visitation with the children.

The Court’s opinion details instance after instance of the mothers deliberate and willful attempts to alienate the children from the father, including false reports of child abuse, bad-mouthing the father in the presence of the children, and deliberately scheduling theater tickets, family events and social activities for the girls during the father’s visitation.

The New York Post reported that as a result of the mother’s efforts the children now hate their father. "They tell me I'm strictly their biological father," Ted Rubin, the father said, "and their stepfather is their real father."

In the past, courts have ordered a change of custody when one parent interferes with the other’s parental rights. In this case, the mother apparently succeeded in destroying the father- daughter relationship. In doing so the mother violated repeated court orders regarding visitation. The mother has to be penalized in a way that she is forced to learn that Court orders have teeth and can be enforced. Jail time for her contempt of court may be the only punishment she understands.

On the other hand, the mother’s imprisonment is not going to endear the father to his daughters. It seems inevitable that the girls will continue to blame the father for putting the mother in jail.

In Abbott v. Abbott, the father and the mother divorced in Chile. The Chilean court granted the mother custody of their son while allowing the father only visitation rights. At the mother’s request, the Chilean court issued a ne exeat order prohibiting either parent from removing the child from Chile without the agreement of both parents.   Unable to find work in Chile, and without the father’s consent, the mother  left Chile with their son and returned to the United States. The father found the mother and child in Texas and moved to enforce the ne exeat order. 

Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, said the ne exeat clause in a Chilean court order conferred a "right of custody" on the noncustodial father within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Since  the clause conferred a right of custody, wrote Kennedy, the father may seek to enforce the treaty's remedy — a petition to return the child, in this case to Chile. 

In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that the father’s  ne exeat right conferred upon him shared authority to “determine the child’s place of residence,” which falls within the scope of a parent’s “right of custody” under the Convention.  Accordingly, the father’s ne exeat right was enforceable pursuant to Hague Convention procedures.

As pointed out in the SCOTUSblog, the underlying policy for the Court’s decision, enforcing  the return remedy is that the  return remedy serves the Convention’s end of ensuring that custody disputes are resolved in the courts of a child’s habitual residence.  A contrary ruling might actually encourage child abduction for the purposes of forum shopping.

The Court did not order the return of the child and remanded the case for further consideration.   In doing so, the Court noted that there are treaty exceptions to the return remedy. For example, one exception to return arises where there is a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child; another involves the child's age and maturity to object to return.  

The parties, Debra H. and Janice R., entered into a Vermont civil union in 2003. A month later, Janice R., who was artificially inseminated, gave birth to M.R. Janice denied Debra’s requests to adopt M.R. and their relationship soured. When Janice refused Debra’s efforts to have visitation with M.R., Debra commenced an action seeking visitation.

Applying New York law established in the case Alison D. v. Virginia M., the Court declined to extend parental rights to persons who are not the biological or adoptive parents of the children.

In doing so, the court expressly declined to establish criteria for parenthood in relationships in which one partner or spouse is not the biological parent, saying a more flexible standard could invite claims of parental rights by people who have no business raising them.

Parents could not possibly know when another adult’s level of involvement in family life might reach the tipping point and jeopardize their right to bring up their children without the unwanted participation of a third party. . .

In sum, Alison D., in conjunction with second-parent adoption, creates a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic breakups otherwise fraught with the risk of "disruptive . . . battle[s]" (Jacob, 86 NY2d at 659) over parentage as a prelude to further potential combat over custody and visitation.

Though neither the biological or adoptive parent, Debra H. was granted parental rights because the parties had entered into a civil union. The Vermont civil union law requires that “all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law” of marriages be accorded in civil unions.

This decision, in effect, established two sets of standards for children of same-sex couples: one set for those born to couples with a legally recognized relationship, and another for those born to couples without legal recognition. In the absence of a legally cognizable relationship, the party must be either the adoptive or biological parent to acquire parental rights. A non biological or adoptive parent in a civil union or, perhaps, marriage, may acquire rights by virtue of the relationship.

Ms. Bettelheim’s correctly urges that custody battles are damaging to children. Indeed, most family law practioner’s would agree that children are the unintended victims in contested divorces, particularly when custody is in issue. As a result, most would agree that reducing family conflict and the acrimony of divorce would be beneficial to the children’s well-being.

As Ms. Bettelheim aptly points out, however, litigated custody battles have just the opposite effect; parents at war are forced to “do their utmost to demonstrate that they are the better parent — and that the other one is worse, unfit or even abusive.”

Her solution, however, to force parents to enter into binding mediation agreements that “could not be discarded or contested later if new disagreements were to arise” is untenable.

First, the needs of the children and their relationships with their parents change over time; parents must have an ability to address these changes with court intervention if necessary. Clearly, a parenting plan created when children were of pre-school age will not address the needs of teenagers.

Secondly, a non-modifiable custody plan would give little consequence to a parent who willfully violates a visitation schedule or attempts to alienate the children from the other parent.

Perhaps a better solution to lessening the pain inflicted from a contested custody battle would be to start with a presumption that both parents are fit and that some type of joint custody arrangement is warranted. In most cases, both parents want to be involved all facets of their children’s lives; decisions regarding the children’s health education and welfare should be shared. Likewise, children should be afforded sufficient time with both parents to create strong and lasting bonds.

Obviously, joint custody could never be an option in cases, where, for instance, there is evidence of abuse, abandonment or mental illness.

If sole custody was an option only in those cases where one of the parents was unable, unwilling or unfit to share custody, I am sure there would be far fewer custody fights, thereby achieving Bettelheim’s goal of “peace between parents” and an end to custody litigation.
 

As difficult as divorce is for the parties, it is far more traumatic for the children. When parents divorce, every aspect of the children’s life is up-ended as they watch their parents prepare to go to war against each other.

Children, who should enjoy the unconditional love and affection of both parents, may be drawn into the battle as their loyalty is tested. A showing or expression of affection for one parent could be taken as a sign of betrayal to the other. Children must stagger through an emotional minefield while their parents battle.

Although it seems like common sense, in order to minimize the children’s battle scars, parents need be mindful of the messages they are sending to the children. In particular, they need be cognizant of not only what they are saying, but how they are saying it. Of course, some subjects are just off limits.

The Texas Family Law Blog offers an instructive guide of things not to say to children and I have interposed my thoughts.

1. Do not say “Nothing is going to change.”

Be honest with you children and don’t lie. The truth is probably everything that matters to the children is going to change- the children’s relationship with each of their parents is going to be different. The family will no longer be intact and the children may even have to move and change schools. The economics of the family may change.

Perhaps offer that change offers new opportunities and that change does not have to be bad.

2. Do not talk negatively about the other parent to the children.

Though you may be tempted to vent your frustration to your children, don’t!
If your spouse is unloving, cheap or selfish, in time your kids will figure it out on their own. In the interim, the children should be directed to love and respect both parents

3. Do not blame the divorce on the children or your spouse.

Divorce is never just one person’s fault and it is certainly not the fault of the children.

4. Do not discuss the details of the case with the children.

There is no reason for the children to know the details of the divorce. Court documents should not be left on the kitchen counter for children to pick up and casually read.

5. Do not use the children to spy on your ex.

When the children come back from visiting your ex, don’t interrogate them on what the ex said about you or what they did. They children should not be your messenger or your spies.

6. Do not  argue with your ex in front of the children.

Children have two parents. They are entitled to share the love and affection of both. In the end, parents should not do anything to prevent that from happening.

 

Last year the case settled after several days of lurid testimony about Peter Cook's affair with a teenage store clerk and revelations that he spent thousands of dollars downloading pornography.

Sophia Chang and John Valenti report in Newsday that the in the current dispute:

Cook wanted Brinkley found in contempt of court for allegedly failing to deliver their son's passport to his house in November, which, Cook said, caused Jack to miss a school trip to Egypt. In return, Brinkley's attorneys filed a countermotion to hold Cook in contempt for discussing the marriage on talk shows in violation of a confidentiality agreement.

Though, the parties were apparently able to resolve their dispute, they learned that even after a divorce cases are “settled,” agreements involving custody and visitation of children are not final.

To often, parties are so antagonistic towards each other that they rigidly adhere to custody and visitation schedules that are not workable. Rather than being flexible and mature, some parents use a visitation schedule like a sword-in effect, to deprive the other parent ( and the children) of quality bonding time.

Parenting time schedules cannot be written in stone. School vacations, extra-curricular activities and special occasions may not coincide with the provisions of a settlement agreement written weeks or months, never mind years earlier.

Divorced parents do not have to love or even like each other. But as Peter Cook, sincere or not, summed up to the Associated Press what is required is to “remove conflict so that we can go on about our lives. I respect my children's time with their mom, and all I ask is that she respect their time with me."

Judge W. Dennis Duggan dismissed a contempt proceeding, against a non-custodial father who had changed the dosage of his fifteen-year-old daughter's medication during his parenting time. The father, a doctor, believed that his daughter’s prescription was inappropriate.

Judge Duggan stated that "While it is the general principle that the custodial parent possesses the sole authority to make medical decisions for her child, this does not relegate a non-custodial parent to the status of a potted plant."

. . . .Furthermore, he stated that the parent who is caring for a child, whether or not he has sole custody, "has a residual authority to make decisions in the child's best interest that are called for by the immediate circumstances--even if those decisions might overlap with or intrude upon the other parent's 'sole custody' authority.

Rather than unilaterally taking it on himself to change the prescription, the father, with the benefit of hindsight, probably would have been better off, at least demonstrating that he, at least, consulted with the mother and the child’s treating physician before unilaterally acting. That said, over-medicating a child is an exigent circumstance, requiring immediate action.

Regardless, it is still refreshing to see a court recognize that a non custodial parent’s voice and opinions must be heard in connection with important decisions regarding his children’s health and safety. Though not legally empowered to make decisions, the non custodial parent still possesses the duty to protect his children’s best interests.
 

The more I hear and read, the more disturbing the case becomes. As in all custody cases, the custody award will be based upon the best interests of the children.

In most cases between a parent and a third person, it is presumed that it would be in the best interests of the children to be with the parent. In this case, the three children have two biological mothers, the identity of only one is known. Regardless, I believe no court would ever consider splitting the children up.

I would have serious concerns about Debbie Rowe, the biological mother of Prince Michael and Paris, having custody of the children. She voluntarily relinquished (for a large payment) custody of the children. Moreover, following the death of the father, she sat on the “sideline” considering whether she even wants to pursue seeking custody of the children. Seems to me a mother truly concerned about the welfare of her children would not take over two weeks to consider her options.

Even more disturbing are the reports that she does not consider herself the parent of the children. . The New York Post quotes Rowe as saying:

Do I want the kids? Hell no. . .

"I'm not going after custody. These kids are not mine. They never were mine. They were always Michael's.

The alternative choice, Michael’s mother Katherine Jackson, is equally disturbing. Michael accused his father of abusing him when he was a child. Hence, the question - where was Katherine while Michael was being abused? If she idly sat by and permitted the abuse to occur, is she not as complicit as the actual abuser? Should Michael’s children potentially be exposed to the same abuse?

In any event, all we can do is sit back and watch what happens. Stay tuned.
 

In the age of social networking, new rules of apply to couples going through divorce.
The rules, as compiled by Time, can succinctly be boiled to one- “Discretion is the better of valor.”

1. Don’t brag.

Your claims of poverty will ring hollow if you brag on Facebook about your purchases of expensive items or post photographs of lavish vacations.

2. Keep the party off-line

Sure you may want to let off some steam, but if you are engaged in a custody fight, the pictures of you holding a bong in one hand and a half empty bottle of “Jack” in the other are not going to win you points with the judge. They probably are not going to be too helpful when lecturing your kids about sobriety or on your next job interview.

3. Guilt by association.

You are who you hang out with. See Rule No 2.

4. Keep the details of the divorce private.

Don’t fuel the fire with comments and criticisms on the internet. No one likes their spouse’s divorce attorney or the judge after an unfavorable ruling. But remember, the judge is going to make many rulings in the course of a case- some you will win, others you will lose. Do you really want the judge to rule on your case after you publicly criticized him or her?

5. Don’t Defriend.

As Time points out, unless it is high conflict, “Don't "defriend" in-laws or your ex's friends right away. People need time to adjust.”
 

In the same week Governor Paterson announced that he was introducing legislation to recognize same sex marriage, a couple decisions involving the custody rights of same sex marriages were announced.  

In the first, Debra H. v. Janice R., the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the same sex partner of a woman who gave birth did not have standing to assert parental rights after the parties broke up.   The Court ruled that although Debra H., the non biological parent,

 [S]erved as a loving and caring parental figure during the 2 ½ years of the child’s life, she never legally adopted the child. 

Based upon this reasoning, the court held that a party who is neither the biological nor the adoptive parent of a child lacks standing to seek custody or visitation rights under Domestic Relations Law §70.  

 In another case, a woman whose donated egg was implanted in her same-sex partner was permitted to adopt the resulting child. The parties were lawfully wed in Holland.  

  This case presented the novel issue whether a party, who was not legally married to the child’s mother at the time of conception, but who is genetically the mother can legally adopt the child. 

 In Matter of Sebastian, the Surrogate granted the petition, even though alternatives to adoption may have been available.   Two viable alternatives were obtaining an order of filiation or being listed as a parent on the child’s birth certificate. 

 The parties sought an adoption because they felt only an order of adoption would ensure that all the states and the federal government would recognize the adoptive mother as the child’s parent.  

 The Court specifically noted that

 Although it is true that an adoption should be unnecessary because Sebastian was born to parents who marriage was legally recognized in this state, the best interests of this child require a judgment that will ensure recognition of both Ingrid and Mona as his legal parents throughout the United States.

 These cases further highlight complex child custody issues faced by same sex couples in the absence of legally recognized marriage.